Introduction
Since the isolation of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) subtype H5N1 from a domestic goose from Guangdong Province in China (A/goose/Guangdong/1/96) in 1996, H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) has been identified in domestic poultry and/or wild birds from 61 countries (15) . The disease has also been confirmed in over 380 people, with more than 230 fatalities (4) . (Table 1) . Official notification of mortality in chickens caused by H5N1 HPAIV infection was made first from Vietnam in December 2003 (8) . Indonesia reported disease in January 2004, but retrospective assessment suggests that outbreaks of the disease occurred in domestic poultry in Indonesia as early as August 2003 (9) . Similarly, disease may have been present in Vietnam prior to December 2003 (8) . High poultry mortalities due to other infections such as Newcastle disease are common in some Southeast Asian countries and this may have contributed to delays in detection and diagnosis of HPAI (8) Multiple strains of HPAIV H5N1 were circulating in the region, complicating the epidemiological investigation of the epidemic. Most of the virus subtypes were derivatives of genotype Z, which was first identified in Hong Kong in 2002 and is itself derived from A/goose/Guangdong/1/96. It appears that this genotype is more virulent than its predecessors and is able to infect a wider range of species. Prior to this, six Asian lineage H5N1 genotypes (A, B, C, D, E and X 0 ) had been identified from aquatic and terrestrial poultry. Eight new genotypes, including Z, were identified after 2002 (7) . Although the viruses causing outbreaks in the region were all genotype Z, also now called Asianlineage H5N1, the subtype isolated from Indonesian outbreaks in 2003 and 2005 is now recognised as being different from those found in Thailand, Vietnam, Lao PDR and Cambodia. Genetic studies suggest that in the latter four countries the outbreaks were epidemiologically linked, with either a single introduction or multiple concurrent introductions from a common source (11) . It was proposed that the initial spread occurred concurrently in a number of countries from wild birds to domestic poultry (9) . However, the rapid spread of very virulent infectious bursal disease virus throughout Southeast Asia in 1990/1991 demonstrated that infections of poultry can spread quickly throughout the industry in that region, even without the involvement of wild birds. Subsequent spread of H5N1 HPAIV within the region has been attributed to movement of domestic poultry and poultry products, and of people.
Propagation of the epidemic
Between 1999 and 2002 HPAIV H5N1 was isolated from healthy ducks in China and these viruses were shown to be antigenically similar to A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 (2). In 2001 a cross-sectional study of live bird markets in Vietnam found HPAIV H5N1 in healthy geese (10) . In both cases the viruses were highly pathogenic for chickens. The H5N1 viruses found in 2001, however, differed genetically, antigenically, and in the resulting pathology, from those that later caused outbreaks in Vietnam in 2004 (9, 10) .
Indonesia reported its first case of HPAIV H5N1 in poultry in January 2004 (16) , although the epidemic is believed to have started in August 2003 (9) . The disease is now considered endemic in many areas of the islands of Java, Bali and Sumatra, and in the southern Sulawesi (11, 13) . As of December 2008, only two of Indonesia' s 33 provinces had not reported outbreaks of the disease. On sequence analysis Indonesian viruses group to subclade 2.1 (Fig. 1) .
As previously stated, the initial outbreaks in Thailand, Vietnam, Lao PDR and Cambodia occurred in late 2003, with a second wave in mid 2004 (8) . Viruses in these outbreaks belonged to clade 1. Circulating viruses in the region today continue to belong to this clade, in addition to clade 2.3, suggesting a second introduction of HPAIV H5N1 in the region (Fig. 1 ). Subsequently, Thailand 
Epidemiological considerations
The epidemiology of Asian H5N1 HPAIV differs in a number of ways from previous HPAIV:
-in late 2000/early 2001 there was an expansion of the host range of the HPAIV H5N1 to ducks, attributed to genetic changes in the virus, sometimes resulting in disease but often with asymptomatic infections. This is thought to be a significant factor in spread of the disease in the Southeast Asian region, particularly when combined with free-range duck rearing systems in some countries (8, 11, 12) ; -the current Asian lineage HPAIV H5N1 appears to be circulating in several species of wild birds, an uncommon occurrence for HPAIV (9) . An involvement of domestic ducks in the reassortment of H5N1 viruses and their phylogenetic similarities to wild aquatic species may have contributed to this phenomenon (11);
-there appears to have been a change in transmission from the faecal/oral route to the respiratory route in poultry and in some wild aquatic bird species. Recent studies using current strains of H5N1 found that in juvenile mallards and Pekin ducks, virus was present in higher titres in the trachea than the cloaca, both in inoculated and in contact birds (1, 12);
-as with other infectious diseases of poultry, continuing propagation of infection in the region has been attributed to trade and movement of live birds, free range duck rearing systems, live bird markets and minimal biosecurity in semi-intensive poultry production systems (6, 8, 11, 12) .
After an intensive month of surveillance by the Thai Government at the end of 2004 (the 'X-ray survey'), a strong association between the distribution of HPAI outbreaks and free-ranging ducks was observed. Other associated factors included the number of native chickens, the number of fighting cocks and the size of the human population. Outbreaks also occurred more commonly on lower plains than in more elevated regions (6) . This correlation between duck rearing areas and poultry outbreaks was not seen in the initial outbreaks of late 2003 to early 2004 (8) . The second wave of outbreaks in Vietnam was also correlated with the number of ducks in the region (6, 9).
Seasonally, the peak time for HPAIV H5N1 outbreaks in Southeast Asia is winter. Cooler temperatures (which increase virus survival time) and the increased demand for, and movement of, poultry for festivals have been considered contributing factors for this seasonality.
Under the World Health Organization (WHO)/ World
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)/ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) classification system, ten clades and many sub-clades of Asian-lineage H5N1 are now recognised ( Fig. 1) (14) . These clades are based on phylogenetic differences in the haemagglutinin (HA) gene, but do not differentiate genotypes or antigenic variants. As such, more than one genotype is seen in some of the phylogenetic clades (11 The development of antigenic variants has the potential to change the way vaccines for HPAI are developed, marketed, and used, and will certainly impose more rigorous requirements for monitoring and surveillance within the framework of vaccination programmes.
Opportunities for control
Control of H5N1 HPAI in Southeast Asian countries has been made difficult by the complexities of the poultry industry and by the huge poultry populations. For example, Indonesia has a commercial poultry population of up to 1.2 billion birds, and 300 million village chickens. Indonesia has a large free-range duck industry and village ducks are common. Vietnam and Thailand have even larger grazing duck industries, and this type of husbandry system is considered to present huge biosecurity problems. However, even farms commercially raising chickens, either broilers or layers, have not practiced any effective biosecurity in the persistently infected countries. In a country the size of Indonesia there are not enough financial resources to vaccinate all poultry, and vaccination has mostly been practiced in an ad hoc manner by interests seeking to protect commercial investments. However, such vaccination programmes have not been conducted under any system of coordinated monitoring.
The huge size of the poultry industries in less affluent countries also leads to situations where there are not sufficient funds to implement an effective culling and compensation approach to disease control. If infectious animal diseases are to be successfully managed, the blocking of the chain of transmission from infected to uninfected animals is an essential component of control programmes. Transmission is blocked by strategies such as culling of infected animals, and movement controls from known infected premises or areas to uninfected areas or premises. Quarantine and farm-gate biosecurity are strategies designed to protect disease-free places, but are frequently not sufficient as stand-alone strategies. The control of the movement of infected birds is an essential complementary measure.
Poultry marketing systems are complex in Southeast Asia, and vary from totally informal arrangements in villages and with smallholder producers to more regulated requirements for the commercial sector that are usually not effectively implemented. The management of potentially infected birds through the marketing system is a facet of the industry that is receiving increasing attention among countries in the region. There is anecdotal information that a component of risk management in poultry raising in some areas has involved rapidly disbursing birds to market at the first signs of ill health in a flock. Studies of birds in the market chain confirm high levels of infection, and by inference, of transmission. Success in dealing with such issues will be an essential component of H5N1 management in the region.
There has been a huge international response to the challenge of H5N1 in Southeast Asian countries, particularly with the objective of reducing human exposure to infection and, consequently, the number of human cases. This is seen as an essential component of managing the risk of a pandemic outbreak of H5N1 influenza in people. The collaborative programmes throughout the region have seen significant gains in capacity building in the participating countries, in terms of public and veterinary laboratory diagnostic capability, Veterinary Services, public and veterinary disease management systems, surveillance, biosafety, public awareness and policy development.
However, the future of the prolonged HPAIV H5N1 epidemic in Southeast Asia remains unclear. The disease has been described as 'entrenched' in some countries. Countries which showed promising early success in its control, such as Thailand and Vietnam, continue to experience further outbreaks. Countries such as Indonesia have made considerable advances in developing surveillance and diagnostic capabilities, but are faced with enormous challenges due to the size of the poultry industry, its complexity and the limited resources available in proportion to the scale of the problem. The uncertainty regarding viable strategies for long-term use of vaccines adds to the problem. Attention is being focused on actions that will physically interrupt the chain of transmission of infection, such as poultry industry restructuring, changes to marketing practices and improvements in the biosecurity of commercial premises. It is only through a comprehensive approach employing multiple interventions that H5N1 infection may be brought under control.
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The ; bien que l'on ignore l'origine des premiers foyers qui ont affecté les volailles domestiques, il est établi que la cause de la propagation ininterrompue de la maladie dans la région réside dans les mouvements de volailles domestiques et de produits avicoles, ainsi que dans les déplacements humains. Une démarche intégrée faisant appel à toutes les stratégies disponibles pour briser la chaîne de transmission du virus chez les volailles est indispensable si l'on veut réussir à maîtriser durablement la maladie. 
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